

) "A Change of Heart": Lennan Acta, Jan 87

- (Bant): write a second letter to a friend, or we workers and others: sign a petition, start a group, send letters...
Mother-in-law: "My son said to me, 'Mother, I don't ask you for much. I want you to do this for me.' (got arrested)"

Our Challenging: "How do ^(we) banks explain 'Wf Persy II'?"

MBG: Some people have been - out in PSR — 'Too depressing — we know about people's skin coming off like a sleeve.'

- This war (-to-com) needs not only to be resisted; it remains to be understood.
To work to abstain + postpone its approach, we can't wait for ^{perfect} better understanding;
But if we are to



[To oppose national sovereignty is to oppose the remaining locus of legitimate violence
► (not to scatter its monopoly).]

[e.g. Foucault, on modern identity...]

[Does "pseudo-speciation" mean that species feel a need to estimate each other; but that one is punished...
CM, (not MX, though some fans of doing...) (to "use/cut"
the other...
Threaten credibility]

panel on nuclear war of Am. Psychol. Soc.

MBG "There is really only one disease — a sense of helplessness."

[NO - This model does not explain why Pres/DOD designs and buys the weapons it does; or what he will do; and what he will refuse to do (or insist on doing) against great opposition, public argument, at cost + risk ...]

Nor what does do ...

Why MM-III, MIRV?

Why SS-18/19 Mod 4? *

* Hyp: May be so, too, but both to have a CF cap, then neither. Then, no great victim to MIRV, assuming treaty, or MX!

May be both except inevitability + desirability of NK's world in which "both sides have Type II Det against major provocation (because of mutual possession of prompt cap.)

Barnet: "Even before we weapons, we had ceased to serve the interests states. & WWI..."

[No - US, & WWI and WWII...

that was our school!

[NOT "moral" but the positive lesson of WWII - what is permissible, what war can do for us... "The lessons of strat bombing, of Tokyo, of Hiroshima..."

"Must devalue our weapons; and delegitimize war. Must see our weapons as doing the war less than good..." [Is this like 'slavery'; moral problem? Was it true that

[Is there a white-m or white-initiated movement that has brought out black audience or activists?]

France, US/SU

>>> - Drill, 9 for 83

John Lewis: Sons have little intent - a France, now; would not change by less 3 years from now; after both sides have tested for 3 years.

[But are we already - accuracy) technology? Whelon — in (50-50?) even?
(Sons test now...)

He claimed: SS-18 has accuracy of MX, now:
(i.e. If an already? See.)

If not, the testing is as easy to cut off
3 years from now, as now.

All public statements (Ball) claim latest
MX is true the accuracy of MM III ~ SS-18/19.

d) Whelon: bias is no problem: smaller than CEP.

(non-neg. Carlson issue is: Is it large enough as an increment of uncertainty to have a critical effect on SSKP? for Sons, for MX
Major difference between 200 + 250, or even 100-150 is not critical. (?)

"Gammie is wrong on this, has exaggerated; and has concluded this."

"RG doesn't think off on basis of physics."

b) We do have satellites on low polar (ballistic-type) orbits giving adequate data on gravitational anomalies.
Whelon

c) Wh favors a (bilateral) cutoff of all military testing.

[Does he really believe R shares his "view" on the urgency of getting rid of all FS/CF weapons, on both sides? Is it a "dumb error" that START never does that?]

Ball: Let see Winter 1982/83

1. McN's An Arbor speech, originally addressed to NATO officials, refers to objectives "in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major [non-nuclear] attack on the Alli[an]ce", refers mainly to a US FS.

This is obscure to an American audience (it combines Types I + II but artfully); which would not only not realize NATO plans are FS plans, but would not realize what a change it implies, to avoid cities and concentrate on military forces.

[My BNSP upholders do so even w/o SU strikes US first — even if SU does hit cities, or might do so (warheads not yet having arrived). This is not in itself (much of) an argument to a US FS, since SU would (probably; in my view, until '61) not actually, 1961-64!) have the capability and the probable intention to hit US cities anyway.

But the An Arbor speech is in the context of a US FS, of circumstances in which the US is committed to launch a FS, and proposes to pursue a more rational, more promising strategy for carrying out that context: thus, not criticizing or suggesting a departure from the commitment — as of 1968 NATO speech does — but rather, sustaining it (against a Gaulleist alternative).

2.

^{8 design-type}

2. CF attacks involving LSW — are intended to
"deter "limited nuclear attacks" —
e.g., SU nuclear \rightarrow US FC!

and thus, to be a substitute, also, for conventional military ops (e.g. US nips to SU conventional attacks, or SU support to an ally (who may be under US or US allied attack: e.g. SU support to Egypt, under attack by Israel)).

1973

Sant: We are like the drunk who seizes upon the product that is (exacerbating) his inactivity or the solution

"Sophistication" is approaching arms reduction by ordering 37,000 new nuclear weapons.

"Simplistic" reasoning: "Enough is enough."

There is no technological solution to solving problem raised by existing weapons.

[No informant? No]

Oct 32 Haltom Pall: 47% think another war is likely (?) within 5 years; the chances of surviving even less than 50:50.

Rexford is all of peer mount; his honesty about his views ... brought several million into its stunts; a smooth world from mount.

C at the Dept. of War charged home to Dept. of Defense, "defense" became impossible

"TIC jones, R broke through traditional public assumption that gov leaders knew what they were doing."

[No. They do. If we are not doing what they said they would, as candidates; or what they now say they are doing, or have done; or what we would want them to do, "if we knew what they know (and what we know!)]

NO

~~the~~ But what arms controllers see as good weapons are seen by technologists as bad; "arms control" friend process was smarter, more arms control, than it was. (No)

5 for 83

"By Any Means Necessary" ... (i.e. War... Mass... as "last resort")

(Carte Doctrine: after afflu... and from hostage
(and Shah, Sonoya...))

Under some circumstances, this, promise, or
warning, or threat, is ^{perceived} to make credible;
such as, when it was uttered by Black Power
advocates — rejecting non-violence —
(and Goodwin principle: Means and Ends
are indistinguishable)

Sufficiency
"craziness"
needs

and of the Black Panthers. (see Cleaver: "I am free.")

(But that was not a threat...)

By carrying guns openly, and of attacking police,
they did make it credible they would "defend
themselves" if any was necessary.

("I am a panther...")

Of course, this led to them being wiped out —
promptly.

Black Power — conceived as Violet Power —
did big about center stages, inspired pride +
recruited — mainly, annihilation.

(We want the kind of Revolution that can only
be based non-violently; i.e. rev. against
violence.)

In Nicaragua: USG says its aim is to "increase
the costs" to the FSLN of supporting rev. in El Salvador
(and defying US — general).

But violence changes more than the "calculation
of costs" — the hearts & minds of the victim!

Promotion of needs, of thrusts, of desires (nobody
revenge; "individual respect in strength"); loyalty,
and for others; priorities; acceptable moral ...
as well as tendency to "calculate," to accept risks ...

Liberation, power
& law comes
First, creative
principle
Thus: Shant's
fear of
others' growing
power.

"FA Article"

"Dilemma Power of Deter,"

Ambivalence. (which R wants to avoid)

Not "dilemma" (at least, persisted
20 years; no now)

(Notion of "no new since
1965 or 1970" ignores
MIRV, accuracy, and
including US doubts
in CM, Trident (accuracy,
ASW long-range,
MIRV))

ASW agents against IRBMs in 1958
now apply to land-based missiles:
MM, P, CM.

By supporting Type II, they indirectly
Type I, requiring compensation; but
this compensation is unreliable in a crisis,
because it is hard to know incentives
to prompt attack, without unreliable
unreliable weapons (especially CP weapons),
(to elicit opposite incentive to
remove the weapon).

Show conflicts between types of "deterrent"
Also — show dynamic effects and
interactive effects of "deterrent" (on
Type I) over time,

Show actual US policy; ADD IGNORANCE OR
IT BY PEOPLE AT RAND & LIVERMORE, who

accept (unwillingly, self-servingly) cover stories of "2d strike D-L," or surprise threats, as sole rationale for vast expenses that would have only marginal, prohibitive effect in a 2d strike; who admit to "opposition of FS cap" as segregated, inevitable, unavoidable.

just like stuff used in who believed he was "getting out."

"Do MM now contribute to Tyre I situation — on balance? If Tyre I were our only objective, would we not know the (or bargin the away) — (e.g. US-SS-18/19?)
(Would SS-180 be a major threat with no MMs?)

What could R "get" by reaching among MM-Pak II's as well as forcing new developments?

[Past developments have brought us to a point where Tyre I Sit is not ultimate — in against large SW force — esp. low - ASW
which can be maintained by restrictions on ASW ops & weapons.

|| (Restricts on ASW favor US w/r to needs of maritime shipping, non-military conflict!
Dissent except for FS !)

BARKER

Barker: There is essential equivalence b/w
US/SC — it is a propitious tie for an control
talks w/ SC, and

Adm sees to this it unlikely "top" will both
engage in an control talks and support efforts to

... if you favor an control, you must oppose
efforts to

SC action to negate our "defn" cap. [^{affected} not an initial
cap — that is not
"fragile" (subs)]

X SC has an active ASW program

"somewhat cool story of MX ...

(heat) sides can't come up with any way to
protect it the more severe

MX should not come into existence till it
can be made invulnerable

"Safety is dynamic"

Frege is 8 years away

[PROPOSE ... verification ...

[What of FU? Under what circumstances ...

① If SC was at point when it could detect
& deploy Trident

"An while talk" ... or, unless race ...

Frege "danger to contg" — greater than conventional ...

if NFO

Prolif (Japan & Korea...)



wf not [MM]
dismantle



"not promising enough... so they put them in fixed subs

US FS cap: "preposterous..."
[FU has center points ...]



"SC does 75% in lead-board system
"looks like FS system..."

SUB "FRAGILITY"

SS-18s are real [MX is "fight of imagination"]

Worry about sons... [FS]

[SC will burst if...]



How get Trident I without getting
II, MX, P, CM, N

AND SOV LIKEWISE?

Possessor vs. P/CM

I'm worried (and) about SC ASW cap...

SALT-II now — 8 yrs & freeze

D

subs/ASW

- 1) Defense of our attack is not
fragile [except - practice st]
— thus we could afford to STOP - while-
talk

- 2) (Euro-balancer Position)

"Paradoxes" (= light of Rego warnings + claimed arms + motives)

"Answers"

(1)

Why Rego has postponed any attempt to close the "US window of vulnerability" in 1983-85 period:

Because there is no credible SU threat of ^(A)
protection until there is a credible threat of US attack! [The US does and enlarged real force!]

(2)

(It is therefore consistent with this that Rego ignores notion of an MM-II force (which Nitze estimated would then be 65% of SU ICBM force (i.e. much more of total alert force than SU can!).)

This, despite the US has a surprise cap. — or more importantly, — inclination yet to threat it or use it.

(3)

Also — his START proposal, which does not eliminate CF/protection on either side! — in fact, "worsens" ("wittens" from his point of view) on both!

C:

Von Clause, Thompson, Nitze, —

(Why, though, did hands press for "quick fixes" — that did not provide CF in S-I?

They exaggerate S-I SC threat; perhaps regard Nitze strategy as a premature ^{war} strategy that; (not, surprise); believe it would work;

or else, miss point that a surprise threat (not, a D-L viewer) regards one's own vulnerability to opponent's CF/protection capability; and probably, a CF/protection doctrine, fact, that, a part of opponent.

(4)

Not installed = US declaratory doctrine — "for future, not now" — till PD-59, July 1980.

(5) How about, "decap." tactic?!

"To extent that..."

"...for sure that... for reasons that..."

if MM vulnerability leaves US Type I Det -
the MX-in-first-silos does so much,
much more!

- What R worries about is not "vulnerability"
X "vulnerability" from 1983 on, but
"intend of PARITY," of "incredible" US FS cap,
starting in 1965-69!

"Not "vulnerability" of US MM,
but vulnerability of SU land-based
missiles, due vulnerability of US FS/
threats!"

"VULNERABILITY OF US GLOBAL INTERESTS TO NON-NUC
CHALLENGE"
(not mentioned of SS-18/mod 4)

(The threat of US pre-emption-in-crisis is not
enough for US: we "need" FC threat,
and escalation threat, too: a "bitter" FS
threat than SU.

SU IS NOT GETTING A CREDIBLE
FS CAP (ACKING ASW; and given
C³ problems, etc.)

The "need" for new weapons IS NOT RELATED
TO SS-20 OR SS-18, 19;

IT IS RELATED TO HARDENING
OF PRIOR GENERATION OF SU MISSILES
IN 1965-67 & THE LOSS (OVER A DECADE
AGO) OF CREDIBLE US FS THREAT.

What's new? Why now? Not new threats;
but ² new opportunities (to restore lost US
threats (B) newly-nationalizing a question
of need for US threats (after VN, that / misgivings, ...)

SS-20 & SS-18/Med 4

do diminish (further) US fears of
intermediate escalation.

Why MOVEMENT?

- 1) R/Had/Wandor
 - 2) End of SACT!
 - 3) Weapons progress, deployment
-

R is worried not about the inadequacy
of US nuclear caps
but about the adequacy of the
SC nuclear caps. ...

... not about the vulnerability of the
SS (land-based) nuclear caps
but about the vulnerability of the
SC nuclear caps.

not about ^{com} credibility of SC F's that
but the loss of credibility — a decade
ago — of US F's that

Only now does technology allow us
to threaten, again, $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{to all} of the warheads —
[they can at most threaten $\frac{1}{2}$ of ours — CM,
Tint II, MX don't improve this, for them! till
"soot" they get ASW! Still, they can improve
"pornography" (exhibition) the surprise cap!]

France

1961: "the strategic balance" that Reagan wants to restore:

$$\begin{array}{r} 200 : 4 \quad 50 \times 1 \\ 3000 : 194 \quad 15 \times 1 \\ \hline 194 \quad 15 \\ \hline 3000 \\ 194 \\ \hline 1060 \end{array}$$

"stable" deterrent (in cruise 2.) is not the goal;
unstable deterrent or the effect?
(unless our "opponents" do FSI cap., too!)
as strong as?

- New Wave of FS weapons:

launched under Nixon, Ford (HAK, ICBMs)

(late 60s: MIRV in HCN!)

ABM

cruise: HAK
MIRV

1968-69 trend steps away from "MAD":

Flowering now, with increased accuracy,
as FS weapons + yield-to-weight (e.g. Trident II)

Both doing it (US being started. Want SU have
forgone MIRV? We didn't test this;
we tested any weapons!

X Now: R would rather test new weapons than
test SU (+000,000+) willingness to STOP!

② THE "TRIAD" HAS BECOME A DANGER, REDUCING
OUR SECURITY (GIVEN SS-18 mod -)

ELIMINATE EITHER 1) MM

or 2) SS-18's

or 3) MIRV ("accuracy" of

ESP. WITH MX IN
FIXED SLCMs!

April 82

(nor, the outcome won't be better or worse)
It is not the SU that has blocked
ratification of SALT-II
(which the JCS, and Barbers, regard
as desirable)

Nor, a NFU-agreement, or its implementation
(END)

Nor did the SU ever participate in
a genuine quantitative/functional "review"
till 1964

(nor is it true that "only" the SU did so
after 1967).

Thus, an assertion that a HALT on the basis
of parity was unattainable because of SO
resistance (or negotiation), has little or no basis.

In fact, the USG has never sought an end
to the arms build-up — on any basis other than
superiority, and rarely even then (1964; or, "Bomber Plan")
Our policies have arrived either overruling demands/reviews
by countries US partners, and/or total impossibility of using SO moderation.
USG POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN, ~~IS~~ DURING
PERIOD OF PARITY (1967 - 1982) THAT
AN END TO THE US BUILDUP WAS NON-
NEGOTIABLE, TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
AGENDA : EITHER TESTING, PROD OR DEPLOYMENT
BOTH A PERMANENT HALT,
AND EVEN A TEMPORARY HALT, DURING NEGOTS
(MIRV; accuracy; MX, S-1, CM, Nuc.)
(see present of test moratorium :
what is history of that, & breaking?)

Reagan kept none, probably ¹⁾ to call for SO reduction
while US forgoes new weapons: ²⁾ multiple, treaty and
deployment while talk is: like fine option: i.e. TOTAL HOAX

April 82

(nor, the anti-nuc mount in Europe, US)
It is not the US that has blocked
ratification of SALT-II
(which the JCS, at Barbers, regard
as desirable)

Nor, a NFU-agmt, or its implementation
(END)

Nor did the US ever participate in
a general quantitative/functional "rule"
till 1964

(nor is it true that "only" the US did so
after 1967).

Thus, an assertion that a HALT on the basis
of parity was unachievable because of SO
resister (or resister), does little or no basis.

In fact, the USG has never sought an end
to the arms build-up — on any basis other than
superiority, and rarely even then (1964; or, "Bomber Plan")
Our policies have always been openly demanding reducing
by controlling US bombers, and/or total impossibility of using SO bombers.

USG POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN, ~~NOT~~ DURING
PERIOD OF PARITY (1967 - 1982) THAT
AN END TO THE US BUILDUP WAS NON-
NEGOTIABLE, TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
AGENDA: EITHER TESTING, PROD. OR DEPLOYMENT

BOTH A PERMANENT HALT,

AND EVEN A TEMPORARY HALT, DURING NEGOTS
(MIRV; accuracy; MX, S-1, CM, Nov.)

(see present of test moratorium
what is history of that, + breaking?)

(Reagan's next move, hopefully? to call for SO reduction
while US forges new weapons: ²⁾ missile, treaty and
deployment while talk is like fine option: i.e. TOTAL HOAX

Problem: the repeated tests & test & deploys
(P, CM, MX, Trident II, N)

are committing ²⁾ to another dozen 10-15 years
of arms buildups, and ³⁾ to FS (prompt-launch
systems) (and probably FU) tests.

Multiply, ⁴⁾ proliferate

This can be favored — now, as might — only
by those who (a) want FU/FS tests to be as
credible as possible, as soon as possible
and/or (B) believe a conflict as rare is
desirable, or inevitable.

Those who hope to avoid another decade
of buildups (esp. in CF/prompt-launches) should
consider or support at least a moratorium now.
(This would not wait Typhoid Det., for
5-10 years; since 2) US subs are ^{so} nimble, + so
numerous; b) US is tied to ahead, in every
category threatening outcome: AND CAN AFFORD
TO LOSE LEAD, for sake of use of deterring
no attack.)

Nowadays, the weapons are escalating and
multiplying: THEIR USE IS CREDIBLE ONLY
IN CONTEXT OF AN ONGOING WAR: FOR MOST
WEAPONS, AN ONGOING NUCLEAR WAR —

I.E. THEIR USE IS "PERHAPS RATIONAL", OVER
OR, TEMPTING TO A RATIONAL DECISION-MAKER, ONLY
IF ALTERNATIVE ("PERHAPS GREATER EVIL") IS
A MILITARY FULL OR TACTICAL DEFEAT; OR COSTLY,
PROLONGED, INDECISIVE, DESTRUCTIVE STALEMATE; OR IMPENDING
ENEMY NUCLEAR ESCALATION OR FIRST STRIKE.

Jfj do deter "war", by enlarging its risk (for both)

2) But not totally, & adequately
see Korea, Indonesia, China
Hippies, Cuba (Afghan)
in period of non-US-monopoly;
or US threats of FUL in 1968-69-72,
despite parity;
nor are US threats = ME, or in Cuba,
central to the SC incident;

NO RISKS OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES.

3) BOTH SIDES RELIED ON THIS FEAR ~~to sustain~~
TO PRESERVE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE SOCIAL ORDERS:
US, IN EAST EUROPE (+SC!) (to protect SC occupation
+ exploiting firms)
US, IN THIRD WORLD (to protect US
exploiting firms, which)
D. This is probably incentive for
SC escalation / further firms now: 55-20, 18.

McN saw all this in 1961; but our bombing
was so just th., situation was relaxed
safe + stable (take over Berlin, Cuba!)
However, stakes were high; cost of abandoning
that would get); and McN apparently
came to conclude SC would tolerate the
situation, indefinitely — so, he apparently
assumed we had longer than we did to
change policy, before it became vitally dangerous
(now).